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Reciprocity, Purchasing Power
and Competition
The sales policy of reciprocal purchasing has become
increasinglypopularin the last five to ten years, attracting much attention from business commentators. In its
barest form, reciprocity means the use of purchasing
power to coerce suppliers into becoming customers as
well; the anticompetitive effects of bare reciprocity are
self-evident. Yet, as Professor Asper indicates, reciprocity might not restraincompetition. The position of the
Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice, however, seems to be that an accumulation of purchasing power presenting an increased opportunity for
reciprocal purchasing is violative of section 7 of the
Clayton Act. In this Article, Professor Asper considers
the various aspects of reciprocity in light of the antitrust laws, focusing on the FTC's 1962 decision in Consolidated Foods. He concludes that, standing alone, the
mere accumulation of purchasing power and the resultant opportunity for reciprocity should not be considered
a per se violation of the antitrustlaws.

Lewis D. Asper*
In November, 1962, the Federal Trade Commission determined that section 7 of the Clayton Act' required that Consolidated Foods Corporation, an integrated food concern, be divested of Gentry, a small processor of dried onions and garlic,
which it had acquired in 1951. Of this decision Professor Milton
Handler observed that while the narrow issue before the Commission was the legitimacy of a particular conglomerate merger,
*Professor of Law, University of Maryland.
1.Clayton Act § 7, 38 Stat. 780 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18

(1958).

2. Consolidated Foods Corp., 1961-1963 FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipulations
16182 (1962).
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"the radiations in Commissioner Elman's provocative opinion"
were a source of major interest to businessmen and members of
the bar.' Subsequent events testify to Professor Handler's extraordinary capacity for analyzing antitrust developments and forecasting their progress.
The vice of this acquisition, according to the Commission, was
that it put Consolidated in a position to engage in the particular
employment of purchasing power known as "reciprocity." In its
bluntest form, reciprocity involves the use of purchasing power
to coerce suppliers and potential suppliers into becoming customers. The practice was challenged before the Commission as early
as 1931, and Commissioner Elman referred to three prior decisions in which such activities by large, diversified business organizations were held to violate section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.4 From the Commission's reports of these cases
there is little question that the respondents engaged in unabashed
strong-arm methods. Their purchases were of critical importance
to the unhappy suppliers, and threats to withdraw such purchases
were sufficient to induce the suppliers to purchase inferior, even
unwanted, goods and services.3 Quite plainly, these respondents
had been able to prevail over their competitors only because
their "sales talks" included a threat to withdraw business from
the uncooperative. In Consolidated Foods Corp.' the Commission found that the respondent similarly had used its purchasing
3. Handler, Emerging Antitrust Issues: Reciprocity, Diversification and
Joint Ventures, 49 VA. L. REV. 483, 434 (1968).
4. California Packing Corp., 25 F.T.C. 379 (1937); Mechanical Mfg. Co..
16 F.T.C. 67 (1932); Waugh Equip. Co., 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931). Section 5(a)
(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act makes "unfair methods of competition" unlawful. 88 Stat. 718 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958).
5. For example, in Waugh Equip. Co., 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931), high officials
of a large meat packing company acquired an interest in a small company
manufacturing draft gears for railroad equipment. The enormous shipping
requirements of the packing company were used to coerce railroads into
buying draft gears from Waugh. In an apparently corresponding proceeding
before the Interstate Commerce Commission it was found that
the inducement held out to the carriers for the purchase of these
draft gears was the traffic of the packers. Threatened or actual with-

drawal of such traffic served in most cases as sufficient reason for the
purchase of these draft gears, although in numerous instances the
operating department hesitated to recommend their purchase. In

several instances where the purchase of draft gears was forced upon
carriers no tests were made and the equipment so purchased was disposed of in repairs to foreign cars.
Reciprocity in Purchasing and Routing, 188 I.C.C. 417, 432 (1932).
6. 1961-1968 FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipulations
16182 (1962).

1964]

RECIPROCITY

power as a lever to procure sales and customers for its Gentry
Division after the acquisition, but this finding was not crucial.
The decision rested on the proposition that the acquisition put
Consolidated in a position where it could exercise such power
over hopeful suppliers and foreclose a substantial share of the
market. Therein lay the violation of section 7:- "The thrust of
the ruling is that diversification by acquisition is unlawful wherever the potential for substantial reciprocity exists, whether or
not it is exercised, and regardless of the reasons for reciprocal
dealings. ' s
The "radiations" identified by Professor Handler are approaching the pervasiveness of fall-out. The opportunity for reciprocity
was one of the principal reasons offered by the Department of
Justice in support of its position that the Penn-Olin joint venture
should be prohibited.' The opportunity for "reciprocity once removed" was urged as a reason for prohibiting the acquisition by
Ingersoll-Rand Company, a large manufacturer of industrial machinery, of three small manufacturers of coal mining machinery. 10
Most recently, in United States v. FM Corp.,"' the Department
of Justice supported its request for a preliminary injunction
against the acquisition by FMhC Corporation of assets of American Viscose Corporation with an assertion, among other things,
that by the acquisition "FMC will acquire the opportunity to
engage in coercive buying and selling techniques by the addition
of American Viscose Corporation's purchasing power . . . These three proceedings all involved conglomerate mergers in
7. The Commission found that 25% of the dried onion and garlic market
"stands to be influenced" by the fact that Consolidated owned Gentry and
"'many other prospective purchasers could be influenced by the expectation
or promise of reciprocal purchases of their products by Consolidated." That
being the case, the fact that Consolidated's use of reciprocity had been
sporadic and of limited success was irrelevant. Id. at 20980.
8. Handler, supra note 3, at 434.
9. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1903).
10. United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa. 1963),
af'd, 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963). The argument was that Ingersoll-Rand
(a large steel purchaser) could use its steel purchasing power as a means of
forcing steel companies (large coal purchasers) to use their coal purchasing
power as a means of forcing coal companies to purchase their coal mining
machinery from Ingersoll-Rand.
11. 218 F. Supp. 817 (NM). Cal. 1963), appeal from denial of motion for
prelimindry injunction, dismissed, 321 Fd 534 (9th Cir. 1963), application
for prelimnaryinjunction denied, 84 Sup. Ct. 4 (1963).
12. United States v. FMC Corp., TRA.Fn REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.)
70826, at 78366 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 1963) (Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Order).
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seminal condition.1 3 In contrast to the findings in Consolidated
Foods, there had not been, nor could there have been, any actual
employment of reciprocity by any of them. The position of the
Government in each case was that the proposed acquisition would
produce an accumulation of purchasing power which could be
used to foreclose a substantial share of the market. Therefore, the
result in each case was a situation which might produce a substantial lessening of competition. The Government position has
"radiated" precisely as prophesied by Professor Handler when he
observed about Consolidated Foods that "it articulates a new
rule of virtual per se illegality applicable to conglomerate acquisitions where there is an opportunity for reciprocal purchasing."14
Consolidated Foods is even more pervasive than Professor
Handler's comment might seem to indicate, for that case reiterates the position that "coercive exercise and reliance on business
reciprocity is an unfair method of competition within the meaning of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act."' 0 Moreover, in proceedings in progress against General Dynamics Corporation it is alleged that defendant's "so-called reciprocity program" is a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act."" Reciprocity
practices also comprise a major part of the offenses charged
against General Motors Corporation in proceedings alleging violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act by GM's diesel locomotive
division. 7 The total effect is one of increased concern on the part
of enforcement agencies with purchasing practices as possible
13. Classification of the combination involved in Penn-Olin Chem. Co. as
a "conglomerate merger" requires a measure of poetic license. The challenged
arrangement is a joint venture rather than an acquisition or merger. The
district court found it unnecessary to consider the question whether § 7 of

the Clayton Act applies to joint ventures as well as to acquisitions, so that
question is at the moment unresolved. 217 F. Supp. at 115. This case is

included here, because, for purposes of the questions to be examined, it has
the same functional characteristics as a conglomerate merger.
14. Handler, supra note 3, at 439.

15. Consolidated Foods Corp., 1961-1963 FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipulations
16182, at 20977 (1962).
16. Complaint, United States v. General Dynamics Corp., Civil No. 62,
Civ. S686, S.D.N.Y., Nov. 8, 1962, charging that contracts, agreements, and
understandings entered into pursuant to a reciprocity program are unreasonable restraints on trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
17. Complaint, United States v. General Motors Corp., Civil No. 63C

80, N.D. Ill., Jan. 18, 1963; Indictment, United States v. General Motors
Corp., Cr. N. 61, Cr. 356, S.D.N.Y., April 12, 1961, transferred to N.D. Ill.,
June 7, 1961, Cr. 340, charging monopolization of trade and commerce in
the building and sale of railroad locomotives in violation of § 2 of the

Sherman Act.
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restraints of trade and an apparent determination to urge that
such practices be regulated by inflexible and enormously comprehensive rules and standards. In section 7 cases the approach
of the Department of Justice in United States v. Penn-Olin Chem.
Co.,' United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 9 and United States v.
FMC Corp.20 is indistinguishable from that of the Federal Trade
Commission in ConsolidatedFoods: The simple fact that an acquisition (or arrangement such as a joint venture) represents an
accumulation of purchasing power presenting increased opportunities for reciprocal purchasing is sufficient to condemn the arrangement as one that may produce a substantial lessening of
competition (foreclose a substantial share of the market). In the
district courts this position has thus far been accepted only in
the Ingersoll-Randcase, but the Justice Department remains unrepentantY That Justice Department attitude is important is
a proposition requiring little elaboration for anyone who has ever
looked down the muzzle of an Antitrust Division subpoena duces
tecum.
It would be improper to suggest that recent attention to reciprocity results from some kind of spontaneous combustion
within the enforcement agencies. There is substantial authority
indicating that reciprocal purchasing as a sales policy has gained
currency in the last five to ten years. 2 Among business commentators it has attracted much attention and few defenders;2
but however slack and spongy the practice may be as a matter
of sales policy, it violates the law only if and to the extent it
constitutes a demonstrable restraint on competition. There is
little disposition to quarrel with the conclusion reached in the
Waugh Equip. Co. 2 4 Mechanical Mfg. Co.,$-5 and CaliforniaPack18. 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963).
19. 218 F. Supp. 580 (W.D. Pa. 1963).
20. 218 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
21. See, e.g., Address by George Miron (Assistant Chief, General Litigation
Section, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice), Trade Relations Association, September 18, 1963, in TRiuna Rm. EP.
50200 (1963), in which
Consolidated Foods Corp. was hailed as a "landmark case," the principle
of which would be employed and enlarged by the Department of Justice.
22. Handler, supra note 3, at 485.
23. See, e.g., Anmer, Realistic Reciprocity, Rarv. Bus. Rev., Jan-Feb.
1962, p. 116; Handler, supra note 3, at 435 &n.6; Stocking &Mueller, Business
Reciprocity and the Size of Firms, U. Chi. J. Bus., April 1957, p. 73; Chem.
Week, Nov. 22, 1958, p. 38.

24. 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931).
25.

16 F.T.C. 67 (1932).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ing Corp.26 proceedings

that the practices

[Vol. 48:523
there

described

amounted to unfair methods of competition under the Federal
Trade Commission Act,2

7

and there is probably general agree-

ment that restraints produced by such flagrant abuses of purchasing power should be treated as violations of section 1 of the
Sherman Act if the anticompetitive consequences are proved to
be severe. Reciprocity as defined in ConsolidatedFoods, however,
includes more, much more.2 To the extent it includes business concerns "overtly or tacitly" making concessions to one another and
the state of mind represented by "the unspoken 'If I buy from him,
he will buy from me,' " it reaches unilateral action taken by concerns acting in what they believe to be their individual best interests. To the extent it includes the simple, "I will buy from
you if you will buy from me," it reaches or may reach business
arrangements which are entirely free of coercion. The balance of
the opinion confirms that this definition is intended to be just
as comprehensive as it sounds. Proceedings permitting divestiture rather than a cease-and-desist order were considered necessary because the effect of the acquisition was to give Consolidated
the power "to extort or simply attract reciprocal purchases from
suppliers" 29 and because,
a cease and desist order would prevent further overt effort by respondent to obtain business for Gentry through reciprocity, but it could
not remove the attraction, implicit in the Consolidated-Gentry relationship, for suppliers or prospective suppliers of Consolidated to purchase from Gentry solely or principally in the hope of maintaining or
enhancing their sales position with Consolidated."0

Judge Rosenberg in United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. quoted
extensively from ConsolidatedFoods and added:
Moreover, the mere existence of this purchasing power might make
26. 25 F.T.C. 379 (1937).
27. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
28. Commissioner Elman's opinion said:
As generally understood, reciprocity describes the practice whereby
firms, overtly or tacitly, make concessions to one another in order to
promote their own business interests. Perhaps the most common form
of reciprocity is the type involved in this case-reciprocal buying. In
this context it involves nothing more than the simple idea that "I will
buy from you if you will buy from me," or the unspoken "If I buy
from him, he will buy from me."
Consolidated Foods Corp., 1961-1963 FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipulations

16182, at 20975 (1962).
29. Id. at 20978. (Emphasis added.)
30. Id. at 20982. (Emphasis added.)
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its conscious employment toward this end unnecessary; the possession
of the power is frequently sufficient, as sophisticated businessmen arc
quick to see the advantages in securing the goodwill of the possessor.31

Not only may a proposed acquisition be prohibited if it results
in an accumulation of purchasing power accompanied by a demonstrable danger that it will be abused; it may also be prohibited
solely and simply because the resulting accumulation of purchasing power is so tempting that potential suppliers may favor the
merged unit with their own purchases in the hope of earning reciprocal favors.
One defends the practice of reciprocity only with some feelings
of discomfort. It is noncreative, generates no new demand, and
unquestionably lends itself to abuse. The question remains, however, whether the practice is as dangerously anticompetitive as
ConsolidatedFoods and Ingersoll-Rand find it to be. At the base
of these opinions is the flat-footed proposition that reciprocity is
always anticompetitive in effect. Therefore, any acquisition or
merger resulting in a market structure conducive to reciprocity
and affecting a substantial amount of commerce comes under the
prohibition of section 7. Formal authority for this position is
7 2 plus the prior
found in a quote from United States v. Griffith
Commission rulings in Waugh Equip., MechanicalMfg., and California Packing, with an assist from an analogy to tie-ins. The
quotation from the Griffith case has undergone an interesting
metamorphosis. In its original form it appeared in a paragraph in
which Justice Douglas was discussing that particular employment
of monopoly power common to the motion picture theater
cases' - the use by theater chains of the monopoly held in singletheater towns ("closed towns") as a means of procuring advantages in towns in which there were competing theaters ("competitive towns"). The entire discussion centers on misuse of monopoly
power and the use of monopoly to "beget monopoly" 34 The quotation, as it appeared in ConsolidatedFoods, states:
Large-scale buying is not, of course, unlawful per se. It may yield price
and other lawful advantages to the buyer. It may not, however, be
used to monopolize or to attempt to monopolize interstate trade or
31. United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530, 552 (W.D.
Pa. 1963).

32. 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 US. 131

(1948); Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948);
United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944).
34. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 108 (1948).
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commerce. Nor .. . may it be used to stifle competition by denying
competitors less favorably situated access to the market.3 ,

By the time it appeared in Ingersoll-Rand, the quotation read:
What may here be involved is the trade practice known as "Reciprocity." This is particularly destructive of competition because it transforms substantial buying power into a weapon for "denying competitors less favorably situated access to the market." United States v. Griffith . . .. 3 6

To the extent this treatment suggests that substantial purchasing power is to be treated as a species of monopoly power or that
every purchaser is to be regarded as possessing "monopoly power"
over his own purchase requirements, it threatens to render the
terms almost meaningless. Monopoly power has a strategic quality
producing market leverage. Large purchase requirements may
produce such leverage, as witness the Waugh Equip., Mechanical
Mfg., and California Packing proceedings, but not necessarily.
Large purchasing power does not always produce an opportunity
for reciprocity, and an opportunity for reciprocity does not always
result in a substantial lessening of competition. Section 7 proceedings, of course, deal in probabilities.3 If a specified business
practice in a given context may result in a substantial lessening
of competition, may result in closing off a substantial segment
of the market to other competitors, the statute may be invoked.
But such probabilities cannot be constructed on assumptions
alone. The essential propositions of fact upon which such probabilities are determined must be proved. 5
35. Consolidated Foods Corp., 1961-1963 FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipulations
16182, at 20977 (1962). (Emphasis added by FTC.)
36. United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530, 552 (W.D. Pa.
1963), aff'd, 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1968).
37. The Supreme Court has said:
Congress used the words "may be substantially to lessen competition"
... to indicate that its concern was with probabilities, not certainties. Statutes existed for dealing with clear-cut menaces to competition;
no statute was sought for dealing with ephemeral possibilities. Mergers
with a probable anticompetitive effect were to be proscribed by this
Act.
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962). (Emphasis added
by Court.)
88.
Reasonable probability of the lessening of competition in the future
is just as much subject to evidentiary proof as is actual lessening of
competition. Mere speculation or conjecture cannot be substituted for
proof of reasonable probability. Nor are mere possibilities that compe-

1964]

]

RECIPROCITY

RECIPROCAL PURCHASING AS A
RESTRAINT OF TRADE
If it is alleged that a particular acquisition or merger will
probably produce an accumulation of purchasing power which
threatens to substantially lessen competition by providing an unacceptable opportunity for reciprocity, that ultimate proposition
must rest upon proof of three intermediate propositions:
1. The proposed acquisition or merger will probably generate
reciprocal purchasing power in the acquiring or resulting unit.
2. Such power, if generated, will probably be used.
3. Such power, if generated and used, will probably result in
foreclosing to competition a substantial share of the market.
In ConsolidatedFoods the first intermediate proposition was
proved to the satisfaction of the Commission. Many of the businesses hoping to sell products to the wholesale and retail grocery
divisions of Consolidated were among those to whom Consolidated hoped to sell dried onions and garlic through Gentry3 This,
however, is not always the case, no matter how large the resulting accumulation of purchasing power may be. By way of comparison, in the careful examination the Commission has given
the acquisition by Procter & Gamble of Clorox Chemical Co.,1
tition might be lessened in the future, or inferences to that effect,
sufficient.
United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1903).
39. Consolidated Foods Corp., 1961-1963 FTC Complaints, Orders,
Stipulations 16182, at 20980 (1962).

40. Procter & Gamble Co., 1961-1963 FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipula-

tions
15773 (1962); Procter & Gamble Co., 1961-1963 FTC Complaints,
Orders, Stipulations 15245 (1961).
Editor's note: The FTC recently reconsidered Procter & Gamble's
acquisition of Clorox. Clorox occupied a position of major dominance
in an oligopolistic industry; its sales comprised 50% of the national

total and were directly proportional to its volume of advertising, as

were the sales of the other members of the industry. In an exhaustive
opinion, Commissioner Elman noted that the imposition of P & G's
overwhelming advertising power would substantially reduce competition in the industry and fortify the extremely prohibitive pre-merger
barriers to entry. Concurrently, P & G's competitive position in its
aggregate market would be greatly enhanced by the profits that would
necessarily flow from its success in the liquid household bleach market.
Finally, Commissioner Elman pointed out that the merger would
eliminate P &G as a potential competitor in the liquid household bleach
industry. Refusing to consider any post-acquisition evidence, the FTC
ordered P & G to divest itself of Clorox, or to spin Clorox off to
another corporation and distribute the shares of that corporation to
Procter & Gamble shareholders. Procter & Gamble Co., TaDE REG.

REP. (FTC Complaimts, Orders, Stipulations)

16673 (Dec. 23, 1903).
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another conglomerate acquisition, no weight or attention has been
given to the resulting increase in P & G's purchasing power. The
reason is plain. P & G sells its products to wholesale and retail
outlets (grocery stores and supermarkets and their suppliers),
and in all probability these organizations sell almost nothing to
it. P & G has no reciprocal favors to grant or withhold. This
first step of determining actual reciprocity potential, however,
may not always be taken. Penn-Olin4 may be a case in point.
The product involved in this "conglomerate joint venture" is
the chemical sodium chlorate. The great bulk of this product
(in 1960, 84 percent in what was determined to be the relevant
market) is sold to pulp and paper mills, and a large part of the
balance goes into the manufacture of herbicides.42 How substantial are the purchases made by chemical companies from paper
companies, and absent any such substantial purchases, where is
the power to enforce reciprocity? The same situation would likely
prevail among herbicide manufacturers with the possible exception of those who are diversified chemical producers and thus
have other products that could be sold to Penn-Olin or its parents. It is enough to note that, as far as is revealed by Judge
Steel's comprehensive opinion, no proof was offered by the Government of what it was Penn-Olin could promise to buy or
threaten not to buy, and from whom, to get the reciprocity ball
rolling. Similarly, in the FMC Corp. 43 case the Government conceded it had nothing significant to offer at trial that it had not
already offered in the affidavits supporting its request for a preliminary injunction, yet the record appears to be innocent of
any indication of the parties who allegedly occupied the position of potential supplier on one hand and potential customer
on the other - the parties who must be identified with FMC's
newly acquired "opportunity to engage in coercive buying and
selling techniques by the addition of American Viscose Corporation's purchasing power."' 4 If there are no such parties, the "opportunity for reciprocity" is illusory.
With regard to the second intermediate proposition, the enforcement agencies appear prepared simply to assume that if re41. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Dcl.

1963).
42. Id. at 115-18.
70826 (1963
43. United States v. FMC Corp., TRADE REa. REP.
Trade Cas.) (N.D. Cal. June 27, 1963) (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order).

44. Id. at 78366.
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ciprocal purchasing power is generated, it will be used. More
than that, they are prepared to assume that an accumulation of
reciprocal purchasing power will significantly affect a market
whether or not it is overtly used by the possessor. In Consolidated
Foods there was evidence that reciprocity had been used on
some occasions in an effort to procure sales for Gentry Division."
In Penn-Olin there was evidence only that one of the prospective
joint venturers was an "acknowledged practitioner" of reciprocity. ' In Ingersoll-Rand and FMC Corp. there appears to be
nothing in the record addressed to past practices of the affected
parties. On the theory offered by the Federal Trade Commission
and the Department of Justice and adopted by the courts in
Ingersoll-Rand,the history of use or failure to use reciprocal purchasing power is of minimal importance. On this theory, an accumulation of reciprocal purchasing power is accorded treatment
usually reserved for an attractive nuisance: It is a threat to competition simply because it is there.4 7
Judge Rosenberg's opinion in Ingersoll-Rand is revealing. Confronted with the job of prophesying the effect of the proposed
acquisitions on a request for a preliminary injunction, he had
nothing before him on actual effect. He could only surmise that
by "judicious" use of its increased purchasing power IngersollRand "could" increase its sales to coal companies "immeasurably"
Thus, "what may here be involved is the trade practice known
as 'Reciprocity.' "48 The fact that the evidence before him indicated nothing about Ingersoll-Rand's inclinations in this direction was not really significant. "Sophisticated businessmen"4'9
would see the advantage of directing their business to IngersollRand in such numbers and in such quantities that a substantial share of the market probably would be foreclosed without
Ingersoll-Rand ever making a promise or uttering an admonitory
45. Consolidated Foods Corp., 1961-1963 FTC Complaints, Orders,
Stipulations 16182, at 20978-79 (1962).
46.
Pennsalt is an acknowledged practitioner of reciprocity and uses
purchasing-marketing coordination to further its sales efforts. Whether
this is also the policy of Olin is more questionable.
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110, 126 (D. Del. 1963).
47. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
48. United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530, 552 (W.D.
Pa. 1963).
49. See text accompanying note 31 supra. On appeal the Third Circuit
quoted Judge Rosenberg's opinion relative to reciprocity and adopted it
without qualification. United States v. Ingersoll-Tand Co., 320 F.2d 509,

524--5 (3d Cir. 1963).
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word. Moreover, all of this is to be accomplished by indirection,
because it has to be channeled through third parties: Without
any threats, urging, withdrawal of custom, or other overt action
by Ingersoll-Rand, steel companies will probably use their coal
purchasing power to persuade coal companies to purchase mining
machinery from Ingersoll-Rand; and coal companies will probably capitulate to such a degree that competitors will be
foreclosed from a substantial share of the market in mining
machinery.
Judge Rosenberg had other reasons for enjoining the acquisition ° and was careful to point out that all matters in the case
ultimately would have to be proved at a trial. 1 But given the
strong characterization of "unspoken" reciprocity in his opinion,
it is difficult to see what Ingersoll-Rand could prove to win the
point. Protestations of good intentions are of no help when the
conclusion as to anticompetitive effect is based on an assumption of overpowering magnetism contained in an accumulation of
purchasing power. The question persists whether an estimate of
market effect that must rest on such an extended chain of assumptions rises to the level of "probable" effect on competition.
Finally, if it is established that the accused acquisition will
create an opportunity for reciprocity and that the possessor probably will try to take advantage of it, the third intermediate proposition remains to be proved: Is it probable that such efforts
will be so effective that a substantial share of the market will
be closed to competition? In its proceedings against Procter and
Gamble in connection with the Clorox acquisition, the Federal
Trade Commission acknowledged that conglomerates present extremely difficult questions of proof and evaluation of proof.
The question in this proceeding thus is whether the proscribed effect
may in fact result from this particular acquisition where the only immediate effect is the replacement of one competitor by another. In
making this determination, the same tests apply as in any other matter coming within the purview of Section 7, but since a conglomerate
acquisition does not have the . . . "automatic" effects of a vertical or

horizontal merger, such a determination is necessarily difficult to make
from a consideration of evidence relating solely to the competitive sit-

uation existing in the relevant market prior to the acquisition and to
50. Judge Rosenberg pointed out, for example, that in an industry
characterized by relatively small participants, the acquisitions here proposed
would bring into the control of a very large organization three companies

accounting for about 30% of total industry sales. United States v. IngersollRand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530, 551 (W.D. Pa. 1963).
51. Id. at 554.

RECIPROCITY
the pre-merger status of the acquired and acquiring corporations. Con-

sequently a consideration of post-acquisitio factors

appropriatc.2

Less than two years later, in ConsolidatedFoods, the Commission -dug in behind the proposition that "approximately onefourth of the available market stands to be influenced by the possibility that Consolidated will withdraw patronage unless Gentry
is in turn patronized,"' 5 disregarding or dismissing as irrelevant
substantial evidence that this "possibility" had not materialized
in the eight years following the acquisition. The record showed
that Consolidated's active efforts to promote reciprocal purchasing had been sporadic and of limited success;5 4 that the number
of participants in the market had remained constant;5 5 that Gentry's market shares of the products involved had increased by 7
percent (from 28 percent to 35 percent) for one and had decreased
by 12 percent (from 51 percent to 39 percent) for the other;",
that although Gentry and its principal competitor still accounted
for a very large share of the market, a third firm was holding
its position-even though it was "considered by many buyers to
offer an inferior product and inferior service."57 The Commission
attributes the limited success of Consolidated's reciprocity program tothe fact that the efforts were sporadic. 8 On the record
as revealed by the opinion, it might have just as easily been true
that the efforts were sporadic because they were meeting with
.52. Procter & Gamble Co., 1961-1963 FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipula15245, at 20258 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
53. Consolidated Foods Corp., 1961-1963 FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipulations 16182, at 20980 (196S). (Emphasis added.)
54. Id. at 20978, 20978..
55. Id. at 20981.
56. Id. at 20974.
57. In this connection the Commission saw in the reciprocity potential
a threat, at the least, of strengthening the "two-firm oligopoly structure" of
the market. Since many buyers chose regularly to buy from two suppliers,
the reciprocity appeal would encourage them to choose Consolidated as a
second source; even though that choice would usually be over the third
competitor, the one offering "inferior product and inferior service." Id. at
20981.
58.
That respondent has not chosen to systematize and vigorously enforce
its'reciprocal buying policy is of far less significance than that it
obtained the powoer to do so by merger, and that by actually using
its power on occasion to disadvantage competitors unfairly, respondent
demonstrated that its possession of such power posed a real and
substantial, and not. merely abstract or theoretical, threat to competition.
Id. at 20980.
tions
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only limited success. In any event, the post-acquisition history
offers little support for the Commission's thesis that a large, diversified business organization will automatically attract patronage to such an extent that competitors will be "denied access"
to a substantial share of the market. In a market that the Commission found to be peculiarly susceptible to reciprocity pressures, Gentry Division of Consolidated Foods in 1958 was not
a significantly larger or stronger market factor than independent
Gentry, Inc. had been in 1950. Yet Gentry of 1958 was a part
of the only large diversified organization in the market and presumably packed all the purchasing power of 99,000,000 dollars in
assets and more than 268,000,000 dollars in annual sales.o
Where an action is brought to bar the consummation of a
conglomerate acquisition, as the Commission recognized in Procter & Gamble, the probable success of a reciprocal purchasing program can only be estimated, 0 and even this estimate must be based
on proof of all material propositions. In Ingersoll-Rand, for example, the dirty work would have to be done by third parties,
the steel companies. This is an activity undertaken on someone
else's behalf only with the greatest reluctance. Is it probable that
the hold of one machinery manufacturer over a number of rather
substantial steel companies would be so great that the steel companies would do its bidding to the extent that a substantial share
of the machinery market would be adversely affected? Probability
of such a consequence there may be, but the position of Judge
Steel in Penn-Olin and Judge Harris in FMC Corp. is that it
must rest upon proof, not speculation. In Penn-Olin the Government stated its case in the strongest terms, suggesting "market
domination" as the probable consequence of this alleged accumulation of purchasing power.6' Judge Steel was not prepared to
assume that "market domination" would be so easily accomplished against formidable competition present and in position
59. Id. at 20974.
60. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
61.
The Government argues that the financial resources of defendants,
as compared with those of Hooker and AmPot, are so great as to give
Penn-Olin competitive advantages that will ultimately lead to market
domination by it. This contention is based largely upon the proposition that the defendants, because of their size, will be able to use their
combined buying power as a basis for making reciprocal arrangements with vendors who are sodium chlorate buyers, which will give
Penn-Olin an undue sales advantage over its competitors.
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110, 126 (D. Del. 190).
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in the sodium chlorate market. He suggests that it might be
material to determine whether competitors were ready and able
to counter sucih moves by employing the same tactics and is at
pains to point out that there may be a considerable distance between sales advantage and market domination.2
In the FMC Corp. case the Government supported its motion
for a preliminary injunction barring the acquisition with the
argument that nothing would be brought out by a trial which
was not apparent from the affidavits already submitted." The
court found that on these affidavits the Government had failed
to discharge its burden of proving that the proposed acquisition
came within the class of "clear-cut menaces" to competition as
opposed to "ephemeral possibilities."" On the basis of factual
inquiries relating to the relevant market and its composition, the
character of the competition in that market and the particular
competitive effect to be anticipated, and on the "questions of
law -with respect to the effect on competition of the acquiring
of competitive advantages and the effect on competition of
reciprocal purchases and sales," there was no showing that the
Government had the clear or probable right to relief that would
justify a preliminary injunction; "nor do they show that there
is a reasonable probability that the government will prevail
upon the trial."' 5
THE "TIE-IN" ANALOGY
Support for the proposition that the opportunity for reciprocal purchasing threatens anticompetitive effects has been
62.
But'in any event, whatever advantage Penn-Olin might be able to obtain -through reciprocal arrangements because of the combined size of

the defendants scarcely warrants the conclusion that as a matter of
reasonable probability Penn-Olin will ultimately dominate the sodium
chlorate market.
Ibid.
63. United States v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817, 823 (ND). Cal. 1963).
64.

As interpreted by the Supreme Court, Section 7 of the Clayton
Act does not condemn all mergers but only those having demonstrable
anti-competitive effects. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States ....
The

Statute deals with clear-cut menaces to competition and not with
ephemeral possibilities.

Ibid.
65. United States v. FMC Corp., TRADE .FGn.REP. (1963 Trade Cas.)
70826, at 78366-67 (N). Cal. June 27, 1963) (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:523

found in an analogy to tie-ins. 6 The analogy has considerable
force when the party indulging in the "tying" has "sufficient
economic power with respect to the tying product to appre-

ciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied
product ..
"..
,67 Where, as in the earlier FTC cases cited in
Consolidated Foods, a party's purchasing power is so large and
so strategically deployed that it can be and is used to force

purchases of significant quantities of products that would otherwise go to competitors, "sufficient economic power" is evident
and proceedings to curb abuse of purchasing power are in order."
The difficulty comes where the presence of such power is assumed from the mere existence of an accumulation of purchase

requirements - the assumption that any such accumulation
containing a reciprocity potential will produce the market leverage necessary to restrain competition in the product the "tying"
party wishes to sell. The test of "sufficient economic power"
contemplates economic power of a particular character. In a
conventional tie-in the lever, the real market power, is in the
hands of the seller alone and results from his control over
something the buyer needs or wants and can get from no other

source.

9

Indeed, in applying "sufficient economic power" rather

than the more demanding "market dominance" as the test of a

seller's capacity to impose tying arrangements, the Supreme
Court continues to recognize the special character of the market
power being used.
Market dominance -some power to control price and to exclude competition - is by no means the only test of whether the seller has the
requisite economic power. Even absent a showing of market dom66.
In many respects, reciprocal buying bears a close resemblance to the
unlawful business practice of entering into tying arrangements, i.e.,
agreements by one party to sell one product only on condition that
buyer also purchase a different product ....

The prospective customer

"ties" the sale of his product to his purchases from his supplier and
"competition on the merits with respect to the tied product is inevitably
curbed."
Consolidated Foods Corp., 1961-1963 FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipulations
16182, at 20977 (1962).
67. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962).
68. See note 5 supra.
69. It may be noted that the great majority of tie-in cases have revolved
around the use of tying products that were patented or copyrighted. See,
e.g., United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); International Salt Co. v. United States,
332 U.S. 392 (1947). Indeed, in the leading tie-in case involving a nonpatented tying product, Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1
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inance, the crucial economic power may be inferred from the tying products desirability to consumers or from uniqueness in its attributes.1

In many reciprocity situations no such one-sideness is present.
Again, Penn-Olin may be an illustration. Applying the tie-in
analogy here, the argument would run that Penn-Olin and its
parent companies could enter the market and effectively "tie"
their purchases of a variety of products to reciprocal purchases
from the joint venture; that the combined purchasing power of
Olin-Mathieson, Pennsalt, and Penn-Olin is so great that a
substantial share of the market would unquestionably be "tied"
by these reciprocal deals. The facts of the matter are, however,
that Penn-Olin is to be a new-comer in a market already occupied by husky competitors with substantial purchase requirements of their own and that Penn-Olin is faced with the necessity
of getting and keeping some customers if this multi-million dollar
facility is to produce a return. The facts of market life appear
to make it highly unlikely that Penn-Olin is going to be in a
position to push anyone around. In this market the lever has
two handles. Potential suppliers can do at least as much damage
by withholding sodium chlorate purchases from Penn-Olin as
Penn-Olin can do by .withholding its purchases from them. The
Supreme Court has indicated it is not concerned with attempts
at tie-ins where real market power or leverage is absent:
Of course where the seller has no control or dominance over the tying
product so that it' does not represent an effectual weapon to pressure
buyers into taldng the- tied item any restraint of trade attributable

to such tying arrangements would obviously be insignificant at most
[citing the example of- one of a dozen food stores attempting to tie

(1958), the "burden of Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent was not that the verbal
formulation of the test had been changed from "market dominance" to "sufficient -economic power to impose an appreciable restraint" but rather that
tjeparticulir application obscured the kind.of power to which the test had
reference:
I should thin that a showing of "sufficient economic power" in cases
- of this kind could be based upon a variety of factors, such as significant percentage control of the relevant market, desirability of the

product to the purchaser, use of tying clauses which would be likely
to result in economic detriment to vendees or lessees, and suck uniqueness of the tying product as to suggest comparisonwith a monopoly by
patent. But I venture to predict that the language of the Court, taken
in conjunction with its approval of the summary disposition of this

case, will leave courts and lawyers in confusion as to what the proper
standards now are for judging tying clauses under the Sherman

Act.

Id. at 19. (Emphasis added.) 70. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. S8, 45 (1962). (Footnote
omitted; emphasis added.)
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sales of flour to those of sugar 71
when competing stores were prepared
to sell either product separately].

Perhaps the tie-in analogy should receive similar treatment in
its application to reciprocal purchasing: Where those upon whom
a buyer would impose reciprocal purchase obligations have other
places to buy what he sells as well as other places to sell what
he threatens not to buy, the restraint of trade attributable to
his efforts to impose reciprocity will probably be insignificant,
and he should be left to antagonize his customers entirely on
his own.
"COMETITIVE ADVANTAGE" AND
"ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECT"
There appears to be an inclination on the part of the enforcement agencies in section 7 cases to pay only a minimum of
attention to the Supreme Court's reminder that it is competition,
not competitors, which the act protects7 2 and to treat "competitive advantage" and "anticompetitive effect" as equivalents.
Judge Harris took note of this in the FMC Corp. case and incorporated into his opinion a significant passage from United States
v. Continental Can Co.78
The Government views with alarm every advantage which Continental or HazelAtlas might gain as a result of the merger and sees
in each the spectre of anti-competitive effects. But the mere fact that
the competitive position of acquiring or acquired companies may bo
improved by a merger does not establish that the7 4 merger is harmful or
has any of the proscribed anti-competitive effects.

The Federal Trade Commission in its analysis of the "vice of
reciprocity" in Consolidated Foods placed particular emphasis
on the fact that it "distorts the focus of the trader by interposing
between him and the traditional competitive factors of price,
quality and service an irrelevant and alien factor... destructive
of fair and free competition" and threatens to make growth and
success dependent upon "size and conglomeration of business
71. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
72.
Taken as a whole, the legislative history illuminates congressional concern with the protection of competition, not competitors, and its desire
to restrain mergers only to the extent that such combinations may tend
to lessen competition.
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
73. 217 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
74. United States v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817, 822 (N.D. Cal. 19063).
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rivals" rather than economic efficiency. 75 This "alien factor"
contributed to the Commission's conviction that it would be
warranted in finding a violation even in the absence of any
finding that Consolidated had actively promoted reciprocity: All
that purchasing power stacked up in Consolidated might be too
much of a temptation for suppliers who hoped to sell to Consolidated, and Consolidated's business rivals would find themselves defeated by something unconnected with "price, quality
and service."
Perhaps in the best of all possible worlds, competitors would
compete free of all alien and irrelevant factors. Although Congress may some day create such a legislative scheme, none
of the present laws give enforcement agencies the power,
usually reserved for handicappers of horse races, to neutralize natural advantages and force all competitors to start
dead even. That quotation from the Gr ith case does, after
all, commence, "Large-scale buying is not, of course, unlawful per se. It may yield price or other lawful advantages to the
buyer." 76 Food processor X may decide to buy his dried onions
from Gentry, and the factor that persuades him may be his
desire, in the Commission's phrase, "to curry Consolidated's
business."7 7 If such a decision is the product of coercive action
on the part of Consolidated, or if a tendency toward monopoly
is discernible, Commission action is in order. It is quite another
thing for the Commission to assume the position of equalizer
of competitive opportunity and take steps to interdict such
market behavior simply because it involves factors other than
price, quality and service.
This, of course, is not the first move in the direction of
holding that an acquisition or merger giving the acquiring organization an extraordinary competitive advantage produces a
violation of section 7 if competition could be substantially lessened by vigorous employment of that advantage. Divestiture
was ordered where an acquisition provided the acquiring organization with a "deep pocket" of financial resources placing it
in a position to engage in competitive activities far beyond the
capacity of its competitors. 78 On similar reasoning acquisitions
have been barred because they provided the acquiring organiza75.
lations
76.
77.
lations
78.
tions

Consolidated Foods Corp., 1961-1963 FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipu16182, at 20977 (1962).
United States v. Griffith, 384 U.s. 100, 108 (1948).
Consolidated Foods Corp., 1961-1963 FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipu16182, at 20977 (1962).
Reynolds Metals Co., 1959-1960 FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipula28533, at 37255 (1960), af'd, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:523

tion with a reservoir of advertising and marketing skill greatly
in excess of that of its competitors, 79 or with enlarged ability
to command retail shelf space,80 or with new flexibility to concentrate sales efforts in certain areas if competition so demands.s'
These cases shared certain characteristics. With one possible
exception they were conglomerates.82 In each case the acquisition resulted in the introduction of a very large concern into a
market previously occupied by moderate sized ones. 8 In each
case there was evidence that the newcomer had enlarged his
market share rather quickly,8 4 and in -some cases it was apparent
that growth had accompanied exploitation of the advantages
79. General Foods Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (FTC Complaints, Orders,
Stipulations)
16612 (Oct. 10, 1963); Procter & Gamble Co., 1901-1903
FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipulations
15773 (1962); Note, 49 VA. L. Rv.
852 (1963).
80. General Foods Corp., TRADE REa. REP. (FTC Complaints, Orders,
Stipulations)
16612 (Oct. 10, 1963); Procter & Gamble Co., 1901-1908
FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipulations 15773 (1962).
81. General Foods Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (FTC Complaints, Orders,
Stipulations)
16612 (Oct. 10, 1963); Procter & Gamble Co., 1901-1903
FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipulations 15773 (1962).
82. The Procter & Gamble case involved acquisition by a large soap
manufacturer of Clorox Chemical Co., a leading bleach manufacturer. General Foods involved the acquisition by a large food manufacturer of the
S.O.S. Co., a manufacturer of household steel wool. Reynolds Metals involved
the probable exception: Reynolds acquired Arrow Brands, Inc. a company
converting aluminum foil into florist foil. Reynolds had not previously been
in this particular line, but it had engaged in marketing of closely allied aluminum products. Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1902).
83. The Commission, in General Foods, noted that the respondent with
annual sales in excess of $1 billion had entered a market composed of five
relatively small companies, the largest of which had annual sales of $17 million.
General Foods Corp., TADE REG. RaP. (FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipulations)
16612 (Oct. 10, 1963). In Procter & Gamble not only was the fact
of annual sales in excess of $1.5 billion emphasized, but also the fact that
P & G was perhaps the nation's largest advertiser, Procter & Gamble Co.,
1961-1963 FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipulations
15773 (1962), and before
Reynolds entered the florists foil market, "no company was very large and
all were relatively small ....
" Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223,
229 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
84. General Foods increased the S.O.S. share of the market from 51% to
57% in four years. TRADE REO. RaP. (FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipulations)
16612 (Oct. 10, 1963). P & G increased the Clorox market share from
48.8% to 51.5% in four years with more marked increases in certain areas;
all increases were at the expense of competitors. Procter & Gamble Co., 19011963 FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipulations
15773, at 20584. After acquisition by Reynolds, Arrow's sales had increased by 18.9% in only about two
years while sales of five of seven competitors had dropped by 14% to 47%.
Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 230 (1962).
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gained through the acquisition.8 5 On the record made in each
case there was no occasion to announce a per se rule under
which a violation would appear any time a big firm moved, by
merger, into a competitive community previously peopled entirely by "pygmies." In fact, one of the opinions included an
express disclaimer of any such intention G Primarily, however,
the emphasis is on capacity of the merged organization to lessen
competition 8 7 What is merely suggested in these previous cases
is made plain in Consolidated Foods: An acquisition providing
a significant competitive advantage that, if used, might substantially lessen competition is in violation of section 7.88
REGULATION OF COMPETITION BY
REGULATION OF MARKET STRUCTURE
Increasingly, and with some success, enforcement agencies
are urging that competition is best protected by a market
structure and market conditions that make it more difficult
for anticompetitive acts to occur. The most effective device for
market regulation, obviously, is a comprehensive scheme of
per se rules aimed at certain kinds of changes in market structure. If any merger (or joint venture) can be barred on the
ground that it appears to provide an opportunity for reciprocal
purchasing, for tie-ins, or for use of financial and marketing
85. The Commission found, in the Reynolds Metals case, that Arrow cut
prices below cost shortly after the acquisition. Reynolds Metals Co., 19591960 Complaints, Orders, Stipulations
28533 (1960). The Court of Ap-

peals for the District of Columbia accepted the Commission's finding that

Arrow's increase in business was a consequence of the price cutting. Reynolds

Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 230 (D.C. Cir. 1962).

86. Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 Fad 22, 230 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
87.

It is sufficient if the Commission shows the acquisition had the capacity
or potentiality to lessen competition. That such a potential emerged

from the combination ... was enough to bring it within Sec. 7.
Ibid.
88. Handler, Emerging Antitrust Issues: Reciprocity, Diversification and
Joint Ventures, 49 VA. L. REv. 433, 439 (1963). See also Address by George
Miron (Assistant Chief, General Litigation Section, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice), Trade Relations Association, Sept. 18, 1963, in Tntnn
REG. REP. 50206 (1968):
A second question the consummated merger raises is whether it is a
defense to a Section 7 charge that, although a merger has created the
power to foreclose competition substantially, the power has not been
exercised. ConsolidatedFoods has the answer:... In short, where the
power is shown to exist, evidence that it may not be or has not been
exercised is irrelevant.
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resources against less well-heeled competitors, the chances of
competition being substantially affected by such practices are
reduced. If any organization possessing substantial purchasing
power will commit an act of unfair competition by favoring its
customers in the selection of its suppliers, then any market advantage enjoyed in the possession of such power is largely dissipated.
But is market regulation a function properly to be undertaken
under existing statutes?
There is no doubt about the strong congressional conviction
that section 7 should be used to forestall "incipient" threats
to competition or tendencies to monopoly.80 But does the power
to arrest anticompetitive acts in their incipiency include the
power to regulate market structure so as to make such acts
less likely? In some circumstances a need for such regulation
has been found. Increasing concern with the level of economic
concentration persuaded the Supreme Court in United States
v. PhiladelphiaNat'l Bank" that the problem was critical enough
to warrant a presumption of anticompetitive effect where a
significant increase in concentration is shown." Where a merger
brings control of an undue percentage of the market into a
single organization, or significantly reduces the number of competitors in a market, lessening of competition is so highly probable that the burden of proving the contrary is thrown upon
the parties proposing such a change in market structure. While
concentration of this character is typically the product of a
horizontal merger, as it was in the PhiladelphiaNat'l Bank case,
it is not necessarily, nor even usually, a result of a conglomerate
merger, nor are the same effects upon competition to be antici89. S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1950); H.t. REP. No.
1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949).
90. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
91.
We noted in Brown Shoe Co.... that "[t]he dominant theme pervading congressional consideration of the 1950 amendments [to § 7] was
a fear of what was considered to be a rising tide of economic concentration in the American economy." This intense congressional concern with
the trend toward concentration warrants dispensing, in certain cases,
with elaborate proof of market structure, market behavior, or probable
anticompetitive effects. Specifically, we think that a merger which
produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant
market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration of
firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly
showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive
effects.
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362-63 (1963).
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pated 2 Neither the opinion in the PhiladelphiaNatl Bank case
nor the simplified test of illegality there applied can properly
be construed as a license to create a scheme of per se rules for
application to the widely diverse fact situations presented by
conglomerate mergers. Moreover, the effect of that decision is
simply to create a presumption of illegality. It remains open
to the accused organization to meet the presumption with
evidence "clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have
such anticompetitive effects. 9 3
That the rules and principles which the enforcement agencies
would. apply to conglomerate mergers are stricter and more inflexible in operation than what the Supreme Court has established for horizontal mergers is a curious development indeed.
Once again, examination of the Government's approach to the
Penn-Olin "conglomerate joint venture" is instructive. Neither
of the participants in the proposed venture had ever been a
consistent or effective competitor in the relevant marketf4 The
joint venture proposed to enter the market as a new unit, not as
a combination of existing units. In a market heretofore dominated by two enormously strong competitors, there would now
be three strong competitors. The Government's position is that
but for the joint venture, there might be four strong competitors. Therefore, permitting the joint venture would produce a
foreclosure of potential competition amounting to a violation
of section 7. The applicable rule as proposed by the Government
was characterized by Judge Steel as "a conclusive presumption
that any combination specified in Section 7 between companies
having the overall capability to go into business alone has a
pernicious effect on competition and lacks any redeeming virtue; it would make any such combination illegal per se."' 3 No
opportunity is to be offered to meet the presumption by evi92. It is possible, of course, that a series of acquisitions, simultaneous or
progressive, by which a large outsider took over a number of small units in
a market would produce a "concentration." Ingersoll-Rand might present such
a possibility. In such a case, however, the acquisitions would lose the character of a conglomerate and would assume that of a horizontal acquisition.
93. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 303 (1903).
94.

The creation of Penn-Olin did not represent a combination of companies which were competing in the manufacture and sale of sodium
chlorate in the southeastern market or elsewhere. Nor did it represent
a combination of companies standing in the relationship of supplier
and customer in the southeastern market or elsewhere.
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110, 124 (D. Del. 1903).
95. Ibid.
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dence "clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have
such anticompetitive effects." Since each of the participants has
sufficient financial and technical resources to undertake this
project alone, the antitrust laws require them "to compete individually or to stay out of business.""
Judge Steel declined to accept proof that both parties were
capable of individual entry into the market as proof that both
probably would come in individually if the opportunity for joint
participation were not available to them. He suggests, however,
that upon proof of the latter proposition section 7 could be inyoked.9 7 Even with this modification, the rule to be applied rests
on the assumption that any four makes a more competitive market
than any three. If this is to be applied as a per se proposition,
then no evidence can be heard with regard to the relative strength,
flexibility, and capacity to survive of a Penn-Olin as compared
to a Pennsalt facility and an Olin facility individually.
Such an approach is based upon a firm commitment to the
nose-count as the only true and reliable test of market wellbeing. In a recent address to a group of attorneys, Mr. Crawford
H. Greenewalt, Chairman of the Board of E. I. duPont de
Nemours & Company, urged greater attention to changes that
have appeared in the character of competition.95 From the 19th
century situation wherein competition was largely a matter of
"like versus like" we have moved into a period of intense functional competition. New materials and technological changes
may produce new sources of competitive pressure for any competitor in any field at any time. One of the most important
consequences of this change, as Mr. Greenewalt pointed out, is
that "it is inevitable, in the competitive race as we know it
today, that some portion of our industrial establishment will be
superseded almost as a matter of yearly routine."
Plainly, any responsible business organization aware of the
pattern Mr. Greenewalt describes must take all possible measures
to minimize its vulnerability to technological "superseding." This
96. Id. at 12S.
97.
The fact that Olin and Pennsalt each had the capability of building a
plant and competing individually is of no controlling significance. It is
important only as a factor in determining whether as a matter of
probability both companies would have entered the market as individual competitors if Penn-Olin had not been formed.
Id. at 130.
98. Address by Crawford H. Greenewalt, Section of Antitrust Law, American Bar Association, Aug. 11, 1963.
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is one of the drives behind the accelerated movement toward
diversification99 and may be a prime reason for a company's
decision to proceed in some directions by way of merger or joint
venture. Penn-Olin; in fact, appears to offer a good illustration
of the kind of risk described. The plant contemplated by the
joint venture would cost about six and one-half million dollars.
An extraordinary percentage of the product is devoted to a
single use- bleaching pulp and paper. A single technological
development, an improved method of bleaching pulp and paper
using some other material, and as much as 80 percent of the
market for this expensive facility could be lost.0 0 It may be
that in such a situation a combination of resources will permit
construction of a unit better able to adjust to abrupt changes
in the market than two smaller units would be. It may be that
a smaller commitment of capital would leave each of the participants in a more flexible position to withstand similar technological assaults in other markets. It may be that the economics of plant construction taken together with the actual
or predictable requirements of the market will indicate that
individual entry will present a choice between two plants, each
too small to be truly efficient or both, so large as to produce an
over supply. In PennOlin all of these propositions or none of
them may be provable. The argument of the Government in the
district court was that none of them is material: Section 7 bars
the venture on proof alone that each of the participants had
sufficient overall resources to come into the market alone.
There are some indications that the Government is preparing
a modest retreat from this per se approach. The jurisdictional
statement to the Supreme Court accompanying the appeal from
the district court decision in Penn-Olin reportedly concedes that
difficult cases for application of the proposed rule will exist in
those instances where the combined effort is calculated to overcome substantial barriers to entry into the market or to share
risks and expenses too great to be borne by a single party.' 1 It
is further suggested, however, that these considerations are
clearly material only when the joint venture proposes to embark
upon "bold innovation" or "pioneering research. ' 10 2 Penn-Olin, it
is said, is not such a case. Putting aside the question whether
section 7 includes a power to sanction "pioneering" joint yen99. Handler, supra note 88, at 437.
100. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
101. 37 BNA ANrIRusT & TRADE REG. REP., p. A-17, Oct. 1, 1963.
102. Id. at A-18.
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tures and prohibits those that are only natural extensions of
present business, the major inquiry is, how are questions of this
kind to be decided, and by whom? Who has the power to decide
whether a joint venture is calculated to overcome substantial
barriers to entry into the market and share risks and expenses
too great for a single party, or whether the parties are combining simply to avoid the inconvenience of competing with each
other? It follows as a necessary consequence of the Government's
Penn-Olin approach that such determinations will be made by
the Government -by
the enforcement agencies.
The first and major step in the case against Penn-Olin is
the assertion that each of the parties is capable of entering the
market alone - an assertion apparently supported simply by
evidence of total assets and technological resources. Pennsalt
and Olin, however, are large, diversified producers of hundreds
of chemical products. The assertion of "capability" necessarily
includes a judgment as to how much these parties can afford to
devote to just one product -sodium chlorate. Given the opportunity, these parties might prove that they are faced with problems of extraordinary risk and expense; that neither of them
has sufficient capital available for allocation to sodium chlorate
to permit construction of individual installations with the competitive potential of one they could produce together; that
individually they would be compelled to enter the market as
two small comparatively weak units, each less capable of vigorous and effective competition with the giants already resident
in the market and each more vulnerable to potential competitive
pressures from within and without the sodium chlorate market.
The "capability" test proposed makes all such factors irrelevant.
Once the Department of Justice decides, by whatever process
of evaluation or selection it uses, that a combination is not
required to overcome barriers to entry or to share risks, it is
seized with an access of restraint (which it asks the courts to
share) and disclaims any intention or ability to evaluate competitive impact. In Penn-Olin, in response to a direct question
from the court whether the court should not consider whether
some arrangement other than individual entry might not in fact
result in a more competitive situation, the Government replied
that it was not proper for the Government or the court "to
weigh the advantages of combinations of competitors and what
they give to the economy and what individual companies give
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to the economy.' ' 3s Under such an approach no company owning substantial resources can undertake a joint venture unless
the Department of Justice decides to leave it alone because it
is sufficiently "pioneering" or "innovating." If the Department
decides the venture is not a pioneer, the inquiry, for all practical
purposes, is closed, because it is not proper for a court to "weigh
the advantages" or estimate probable competitive impact of
the combination as opposed to individual participation.' 4 To
the extent this approach bars even evidence "clearly showing
that the merger is not likely to have anticompetitive effects," 10 5
this rule, tailored for application to conglomerates, is stricter
than the one announced by the Supreme Court for horizontal
mergers.
Any decision that requires a prediction of probable competi103. In a footnote to his opinion Judge Steel quotes the Transcript of
Argument:
THE COURT: Let me ask you: If I should come to the conclusion
that as a matter of reasonable probability, absent the joint venture,
Olin would have constructed a factory and sold its products in the
southeast, .. . does the Government contend that from that the Government must ...win?"
MR. FREED: Yes.
THE COURT: ... Isn't there a further question as to whether or not
the construction of a plant by Olin, sales of products by Olin in the
southeast, would have produced a more competitive situation than
did the joint venture?
-MiR. FREED: No, Your Honor, that would not be a legitimate question. It is not for the Government and it is not for the courts to weigh
the advantages of combinations of competitors and what they give to
the economy, and what individual companies give to the economy.
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110, 130 n.25 (D. Del.
1963).
104. Some interesting comparisons appear between Mir. Freed's colloquy
with the court in Penn-Olin, quoted supra note 103 and his remarks to the
Section of Antitrust Law, American Bar Association, Aug. 11, 1963, where
he was, of course, expressing only his personal views. On that occasion he
observed that the Department did not ignore the innovating aspect of joint
ventures, "We simply took the position that Penn-Olin was no pioneer." He
advised antitrust counsel confronted with the job of advising on a joint
venture proposal to examine carefully the present position of the parties visa-vis potential future relationships, the character of the market, and plans
prior to the joint venture scheme. From the answers to these questions,
"You'll know whether the companies are taking the easy way out of a
situation where they might otherwise have been competing against each other
or whether they are teaming up to do something neither could have done
alone." The objectives of the Department of Justice were simply stated,
"Through enforcement in this area, we simply seek to place limits on the
joint venture craze."
105. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 303 (1963).
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tive effect presents difficult problems of proof and evaluation
of proof. These problems are magnified in cases where proof
must be directed to "incipient" threats embodied in mergers or
other similar combinations. The Supreme Court, conscious of
the danger of "subverting congressional intent by permitting
a too-broad economic investigation," undertook in the Philadelphia Nat'l Bank case to simplify the test of illegality in the
single instance of mergers producing undue concentration.'
Section 7 is to be used to regulate market structure to prevent
this specified occurrence, without the need for proof of particular
economic consequences. Unless, however, "concentration" means
any large accumulation of assets, know-how, or purchasing
power, the enforcement agencies, in cases such as Consolidated
Foods and Penn-Olin, are urging the extension of this per se
approach to a point where section 7 could be used to regulate
market structure by preventing any combination large enough to
create an opportunity for anticompetitive behavior. Conceding
that an undifferentiated accumulation of assets, know-how, or
purchasing power may prove to have the anticompetitive characteristics or potential of a concentration, is it possible, always, to
prophesy that such characteristics will appear simply because
the accumulation is large? It may be that there are some rearrangements of market structure, even some competitive practices,
the consequences of which are nearly impossible to anticipate.
It may be that some operations, some corporate changes, some
competitive practices will not yield to "incipiency" treatment
and must be left for other kinds of handling under the antitrust
laws - including section 7. The fact that existing tests and
measures of illegality make difficult the prosecutor's job of proof
is not alone sufficient reason for changing the tests. Difficulties
of proof may in some cases indicate that a simpler test must be
used if congressional intent is to be carried out, and in others
106. The Court in this case acknowledged that here § 7 required it to
make a prediction of competitive impact and added:
Such a prediction is sound only if it is based upon a firm understanding of the structure of the relevant market; yet the relevant economic
data are both complex and elusive. . . . And unless businessmen can
assess the legal consequences of a merger with some confidence, sound
business planning is retarded. . . . So also, we must be alert to the
danger of subverting congressional intent by permitting a too-broad
economic investigation.... And so in any case in which it is possible,
without doing violence to the congressional objective embodied in § 7,
to simplify the test of illegality, the courts ought to do so in the interest of sound and practical judicial administration.
Id. at 862.
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only that an action to prohibit has been brought at a stage
when no one can predict with any accuracy what the effect of
the new arrangement is going to be. Section 7's power is not
exhausted once a merger is consummated. 10 7 The reach of section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act surely has not been
diminished since the time of the Waugh Equip. case. 10 8 If a PennOlin, by shrewd employment of its accumulation of purchasing
power, grabs or even just attracts a dangerously large part of
the market in which it operates, section 7 is still available, as is
the Sherman Act in appropriate cases.
Manifestly, there are hazards in waiting until damage has
been done or has become imminent. There are also hazards in the
other direction in concluding, first, that every business arrangement which might produce anticompetitive effects must be
attacked in its incipiency and, second, that tests of illegality must
be simplified to a point where probable anticompetitive effect can
be proved without too much difficulty.
If an acquisition or joint venture can be barred solely on
proof that it may present an "opportunity" for reciprocal purchasing or that it may foreclose some undetermined "potential"
competition or that the participants are "capable" of competing
individually or that it may permit the introduction of an "alien"
factor into competitive considerations, then the FTC will have
power to order divestiture because the combination creates a
situation that it regards as unfair, and the Department of Justice
will have power to prevent a combination because it believes
some other arrangement would be more competitive.! 9 The end
result may be an undue accumulation of power in the enforcement agencies -power to regulate market structure and market
conditions; power to equalize competitive opportunities and
107. See United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586
(1957); Note, 49 VA. L. REv. 852, 859 (1963). George Miron, Assistant Chief,
General Litigation Section, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice in a
speech before the Trade Relations Association, Sept. 18, 1963, made it
plain that the principles expressed in Consolidated Foods could and would be
applied to consummated mergers as well as to those merely proposed; and
that mergers shown to have enhanced reciprocal power were as liable to attack as those which have created such power. TRkD E rE. Rr,.
50206,
at 55250.
108. See Handler, Some Unresolved Problems of Antitrust, 62 CoLum.
L. REv. 930, 944 (1962).
109. See, e.g., Address by Daniel J. Freed (Department of Justice), Section of Antitrust Law, American Bar Association, Aug. 11, 1963, note 104
sua.
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neutralize competitive advantages." 0 If these are among the
functions of the antitrust laws, the courts and, no less, the
enforcement agencies have an awesome responsibility, one providing extraordinary opportunities for costly miscalculation.
RECIPROCITY UNDER THE SHERMAN AND
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACTS
A final reminder is in order that the offense of reciprocity is
not confined to section 7 situations. In Consolidated Foods the
FTC concluded that since Consolidated had engaged in a practice found to be an unfair method of competition, divestiture
of Gentry Division was not remedy enough: "protection of the
public interest requires that it be specifically ordered to desist
from any future resumption of that practice.""' This order is
directed to all of Consolidated's operations and is directed at
reciprocal buying as such: "In this context it involves nothing
more than the simple idea that 'I will buy from you if you will
buy from me' or the unspoken 'If I buy from him, he will buy
from me.' 112 An examination of this order is important, not
only to determine what is required for compliance but also for
what it implies about the character of the offense.
What will be expected of Consolidated in compliance with
this order? In pending proceedings against General Dynamics
Corporation and General Motors Corporation, the Department
of Justice proposes that severe positive restrictions be imposed
as a remedy for abuses of reciprocal buying allegedly amounting
to Sherman Act violations."' In such cases there is, of course,
110. Comments, Symposium, Reevaluation of the Impact of Present-Day

Antitrust Policy on the Economy, Section of Antitrust Law, American Bar
Association, Aug. 12-13, 1963, reflected strong opinions by some members of

the antitrust bar that selection of antitrust cases for prosecution is currently
governed by rather subjective preferences of Department of Justice representatives. 37 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP., pp. A1-A4, Aug. 20, 1963.

111. Consolidated Foods Corp., 1961-1963 FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipulations
16182, at 20982 (1962).
112. Id. at 20975.
113. Complaint, United States v. General Dynamics Corp., Civil No. 62,
Civ. 3686, S.D.N.Y., Nov. 8, 1962. The prayer specifically asks, inter alia,

that purchase contracts conditioned on reciprocal purchases of industrial gases
be declared void; that notice of that fact be given to all purchasers of industrial gases; and that General Dynamics be enjoined from entering into
such contracts in the future.

Complaint, United States v. General Motors Corp., Civil No. 63C 80,
N.D. Ill., Jan. 18, 1963. The prayer specifically asks, inter alia, that pending

divestiture, General Motors be enjoined from favoring purchasers of its loco-
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ample -precedent for relief comprehensive enough to eliminate
lingering effects of the offense." 4 It seems less certain that
similar broad relief is necessary or appropriate to neutralize the
effects of an unfair method of competition that may involve
nothing more reprehensible than favoring one's customers with
one's own purchases.
In, contrast to the detailed prayers submitted by the Department of Justice in the pending General Dynamics and General
Motors cases, the Commission's order to Consolidated Foods
is a model of economy: Consolidated is simply enjoined from
"any future resumption of that practice."" 5 In the first place
the Commission does not specify the substance of Consolidated's
"overt exercise" of its reciprocity power beyond stating that
Consolidated admitted "expressly conditioning purchases from
processors on their purchase from Gentry. ' " But antitrust
counsel must decide whether compliance procedures designed
solely to eliminate actual coercion from Consolidated's practices
will be sufficient, or whether the order imposes the larger obligation to avoid patronizing customers, or perhaps even to publish
the kind of disclaimer the Department of Justice would require
of General Motors." 7 The practical problems could be enormous.
Among purchasing men it is instinctive behavior to favor customers and to attempt to place purchases where they will do the
purchasing company the most good. Where price, quality and
service are not equal, favoring a supplier because he may also
be a potential customer may be bad purchasing and may support an inference that purchasing power is being used coercively.
But where price, quality and service are equal, a purchasing man
will consider collateral advantages that may accrue to his company from the selection of certain suppliers over others. He will
not believe he is doing his job if he does not. With its emphasis
on reciprocity as an "alien and irrelevant" factor, Consolidated
Foods comes close to stating that strategic placement of purchase orders to gain collateral advantages for the purchaser is
an unfair method of competition. If that is or even may be true,
motives by preferences in routing freight, location of plants etc., removing

business from non-customers; and further that G. t I be required to give
written notice to all railroads that locomotive purchases will not influence its
routing of freight traffic or location of plants etc.
114. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 53 (1902).

115. Consolidated Foods Corp., 1961-1963 F
lations 16182, at 20982 (1962).
116. Id. at 20979.
117. See note 113 supra.
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the order directed against Consolidated imposes an obligation
on that company to abjure indirect advantages that might be
gained from strategic placement of purchases. An apparently
simple order may in fact contain a very severe restriction.
A member of the Department of Justice has represented
informally that, as far as the Department is presently concerned, no effort will be made to move under the Sherman Act
against a "purely unilateral decision by one firm to purchase
from its customers.' 1n Such representation, of course, says
nothing about how the FTC may choose to proceed. The quoted
statement is sufficiently qualified, even tentative, so that it
offers only a minimum of comfort and guidance to antitrust
counsel charged with advising clients on avoiding the restraint of
trade named reciprocity. What must any company possessing
substantial purchasing power do to avoid the appearance of
trading upon that power if the enforcement agencies are correct
in their assertion that a large reservoir of purchase requirements
constitutes an irresistible anticompetitive attraction? If the
marketing history of a Consolidated Foods or a General Dynamics or an Ingersoll-Rand over a ten or fifteen year period
shows a substantial identity between suppliers and customers,
is that presumptive evidence that reciprocal purchasing has
been indulged? Must the big buyer try to discourage those
"sophisticated businessmen" who would ingratiate themselves
by proper placement of their own orders if he is to avoid the
appearance of the "unspoken, 'If I buy from him, he will buy
from me.'" Since reciprocal purchasing is necessarily a two-way
proposition, will it always be possible to tell who is pressuring
whom or who is trying to curry whose favor? As indicated previously, Penn-Olin is an example of a company entering a market
already powerfully manned, one in which they must make themselves attractive to buyers who presently have regular sources
of supply."1 Would a history of reciprocal dealings, absent
118.

It should be stated that reciprocity, in the present context, will not
refer to a purely unilateral decision by one firm to purchase from its
customers, . . . but will refer to arrangements, agreements or understandings between separate firms to exchange purchases. The notion of
exchange of purchases, however, does not necessarily imply contemporaneous exchange, or exchange of equal value. Nor does it imply that
either firm is committed to make all its purchases from one, or even
a number, of its reciprocals.
Address by George Miron, Trade Relations Association, Sept. 18, 1903, in
50206, at 55251 (1962).
TRADE REG. REP.
119. See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
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active coercion, show that Penn-Olin was pressuring its suppliers
or attempting to curry favor with its customers? The disposition
of the Government in the present proceeding to disregard the
amount of market leverage actually possessed by Penn-Olin
customers encourages the suspicion that where a big fellow is
in a reciprocal posture with a group of smaller fellows, the presumption that the big fellow is wielding the stick is almost
irrebuttable.
Anticompetitive reciprocal purchasing has its origins in essentially neutral business behavior. Like almost any other competitive power, purchasing power may be abused. When it is, abuse
should be corrected. But violations of law that must be postulated upon "probabilities" are hard enough to handle. If we add
violations built upon "opportunities for abuse" and "probabilities of opportunity for abuse," two results follow: It is increasingly difficult for one to know what he must do to comply with
the law, and the power of enforcement agencies to rearrange
rather than merely to correct is "probably" greatly enlarged.

